Volume 6, Issue 5, October 2017, Page: 51-57
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions
Hua Jinliang, Shanghai Research Institute, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China
Received: Aug. 17, 2017;       Accepted: Sep. 30, 2017;       Published: Nov. 7, 2017
DOI: 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11      View  1350      Downloads  82
Abstract
The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and financial institutions are a process of repeated game, but the research on them is still in a superficial stage. Therefore, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and method to analyze the dynamic replication system of asymmetric evolutionary game of two groups of financial institutions and regulators in China. And the evolutionary stable state of the system under different conditions is analyzed. The conclusion is that under different parameter values, the other side adopts different strategies, and the system will tend to different equilibrium states.
Keywords
Financial Innovation, Financial Regulation, Evolutionary Game
To cite this article
Hua Jinliang, Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions, Economics. Vol. 6, No. 5, 2017, pp. 51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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