Volume 4, Issue 3-1, June 2015, Page: 14-16
A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food
Qichen Li, Faculty of Mathematical and Physical Science, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China
Dianyu Jiang, Institution of Game theory and its application, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China
Takashi Matsuhisa, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelia Research Centre, Russian Academy of Science, Karelia, Russia
Yabin Shao, Institution of Game theory and its application, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China; School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China
Xiaoyang Zhu, Institution of Game theory and its application, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China; School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China
Received: Jan. 5, 2015;       Accepted: Jan. 8, 2015;       Published: Jan. 27, 2015
DOI: 10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13      View  3136      Downloads  132
Abstract
In this short paper, a new simple system of boxed pigs with three troughs, three dispensers and two panels is given. The main result is that each pig will enjoy his own labor if the pressing cost is lower; the big one will enjoy his own labor but his food has to be robbed by the small one if the pressing cost is higher but the big pig’s labor can bring profit for him; and none presses his own panel if the big pig’s labor brings loss for him. Finally, an example shows an application of the theory in technology development.
Keywords
Robbing Food, Boxed Pigs, Running Speed, Eating Speed, Pure Nash Equilibrium
To cite this article
Qichen Li, Dianyu Jiang, Takashi Matsuhisa, Yabin Shao, Xiaoyang Zhu, A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food, Economics. Special Issue: Axiomatic Theory of Boxed Pigs. Vol. 4, No. 3-1, 2015, pp. 14-16. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13
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